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INTRODUCTION
The ego depletion effect has been one of the most cited psychological phenomena since Baumeister
et al. first introduced the term in 1998. The authors assume that individuals only possess a limited
(metaphorical) self-control resource or strength that can become temporarily depleted after having
engaged in a self-control demanding task (i.e., ego depletion). In a typical experimental setup
(i.e., the sequential two-task paradigm), participants first work on a task that either does or does
not require self-control exertion (e.g., an incongruent vs. congruent Stroop task), which should
therefore lead to ego depletion in the former case, while self-control strength should remain
relatively stable in the latter case (e.g., Webb and Sheeran, 2003). Afterwards, all participants work
on another self-control task to measure their momentary self-control strength. The assumption
that self-control performance suffers in the state of ego depletion (i.e., the second task performance
is lower in the depleted compared to the non-depleted control condition) has been supported in
hundreds of studies (e.g., Dang et al., 2021) and two meta-analyses (Hagger et al., 2010; Dang,
2018).
THE BEGINNING OF THE “REPLICATION CRISIS”
The ego depletion effect has come under scrutiny in recent years; for instance, Carter and
McCullough (2013, 2014) argued that publication bias might have inflated the estimated size
of the ego depletion effect. In 2016, Hagger and colleagues conducted a large-scale replication
study (i.e., Registered Replication Report; RRR) with more than 2,000 participants from 23
laboratories worldwide, also adopting the sequential two-task paradigm. The e-crossing procedure
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998) served as the initial task to manipulate ego depletion: In the control
condition, participants saw a series of words on a computer screen and had to press a certain button
on the keyboard whenever the respective word contained the letter “e.” In the depletion condition,
participants were asked to only press the button when the word had an “e” that was not adjacent to
another vowel. Contrary to the hypotheses, the study did not find any reliable evidence supporting
the ego depletion effect as performance in a subsequent secondary self-control task did not differ
between the two conditions.
In the aftermath of the RRR, Baumeister and Vohs (2016) questioned the appropriateness of
the e-crossing procedure, arguing that “in retrospect, the decision to use new, mostly untested
procedures for a large replication project was foolish” (p. 574). The authors suggested other ego
depletion tasks, which were rejected by the lead authors of the RRR as Hagger et al. (2016) wanted
to apply computerized tasks that were culturally and linguistically neutral [for a response, see also
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Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2016)]. We agree with Baumeister
and Vohs (2016) that the e-crossing procedure might not have
been an ideal choice to manipulate ego depletion as “self-
regulation is typically understood as altering and overriding
responses” (p. 574). In the e-crossing task as applied by Hagger
et al. (2016), participants did not have to override any response
tendencies, habits or impulses as they had never worked on
the e-crossing task before and did not have the opportunity
to first build up a response habit. To make matters even
more interesting, a recent study by Wimmer et al. (2019) in
which the authors manipulated the difficulty of the e-crossing
task by modifying the text from semantically meaningful to
non-meaningful sentences and by increasing ego-depletion rule
complexity did not find any effect on a subsequent Stroop task,
raising the question of whether the e-crossing task is useful to
induce ego depletion. Consequently, if ego depletion had not
been successfully manipulated in the RRR, it does not seem
surprising that the control and experimental conditions did not
differ in their performance in the second self-control task.
THE MULTI-SITE PREREGISTERED
PARADIGMATIC TEST OF THE EGO
DEPLETION EFFECT
In their recently published multi-site project, Vohs et al. (2021)
made another attempt to assess the size and robustness of
ego depletion effects. For this reason, the authors also adopted
the sequential two-task paradigm in a study with more than
3,500 participants from 36 laboratories. The laboratories had
the choice between applying the e-task protocol condition (n =
20 laboratories) or the writing task protocol condition (n = 16
laboratories). The results were inconclusive; that is, overall, the
data neither clearly support nor debunk the existence of the ego
depletion effect. Interestingly, higher self-reported fatigue after
the initial self-control demanding task was associated with lower
subsequent self-control performance—a pattern largely in line
with previous findings (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2010; Englert et al.,
2021) and recent theorizing (Bertrams, 2020).
In the e-task protocol condition, the e-crossing procedure was
used as the initial task to manipulate ego depletion. In contrast to
the RRR (Hagger et al., 2016), participants from both conditions
first built a habit by crossing off all instances of the letter “e” on
a sheet of text. Afterwards, they worked on another text and, as
was the case in Hagger et al.’s RRR, the control condition again
crossed out each instance of the letter “e,” while the experimental
condition received the more difficult crossing instructions (i.e.,
only cross out the letter “e” if there was a vowel before or after
the letter). In total the e-crossing task lasted up to 15min. We
would like to point out that repetitively working on a simple task
for 15min or close to that in the control condition might lead
to increased levels of boredom. Coping with boredom is a self-
control demand of its own (Wolff and Martarelli, 2020); thus, in
both the depletion and the control conditions, participants’ self-
control resources could have been strained after the e-crossing
task, undermining the likelihood of detecting a possible ego
depletion effect.
Afterwards, as dependent variable the degree of persistence
the participants demonstrated when working on a set of figure
tracing tasks was measured (i.e., time spent on the figure tracing
task and the number of figures participants worked on). To
master the figure tracing task, participants had to trace series
of figures in their entirety with a highlighter marker and were
neither allowed to pick up the marker at any time nor to cross
the same line segment twice (Vohs et al., 2008). Participants
were unaware that some of the figures were actually unsolvable.
Depending on the type of analysis, there was a small ego depletion
effect on how long the participants tried to solve the puzzles for.
While this result must not be overstated as evidence supporting
the existence of the ego depletion effect, it equally fuels doubts
about the assumption that the ego depletion effect is nothing but
pure fantasy.
While our main criticism focuses on the writing task protocol
condition, we would like to briefly discuss the validity of the
figure tracing task as well. First, there are some degrees of
freedom how to analyze performance in the figure tracing
task, namely analyzing the time spent on the task and the
number of tasks participants worked on separately, or analyzing
a combination of these two outcome measures. Second, the
amount of effort one is willing to invest in the task largely
depends on one’s believe that the tasks are actually solvable
or not. If a person realizes that the respective figure cannot
be traced perfectly, stopping the task is actually the better
option than going on. While Vohs et al. controlled for this
possibility by excluding participants who were aware of the fact
that some figures were unsolvable, we at least question whether
spending more time on an unsolvable task is indeed indicative of
“better” performance.
As said, our main criticism refers to the writing task
protocol condition. In this condition, self-control strength was
experimentally manipulated with a writing task that required
the inhibition of certain letters [see also Bertrams et al. (2010)].
In our view, this writing task does indeed require self-control
as individuals needed to inhibit their well-developed writing
habits. However, we take issue with the use of the Cognitive
Estimation Test (CET, Bullard et al., 2004), which was applied
as the subsequent second task (i.e., the dependent variable).
The CET requires participants to guess the answers to a series
of 20 questions (19 questions in the Vohs et al. study) that
have unclear answers, meaning that participants needed to
generate novel responses (e.g., “How many seeds are there in
a watermelon?,” “What is the age of the oldest living person in
the United States?,” “How long does it take to iron a shirt?,”
and “How long does it take for fresh milk to go sour in
the refrigerator?”). According to Vohs et al. (2021), the CET
requires self-control because the answers cannot be determined
algorithmically or with declarative knowledge. This is an overly
succinct rationale from which it does not logically follow that the
CET does require self-control. In previous research (Schmeichel
et al., 2003), it was claimed that each CET question can be
appropriately answered by reasoning and consideration of related
knowledge—or more precisely via fluid cognitive processing,
which is enabled by the central executive of the working memory
system [see also Shallice and Evans (1978)]. Based on the
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CET performance, Vohs et al. (2021) did not observe any
evidence of the ego depletion effect. This makes sense to us
as we cannot see that the CET measures self-control or any
other executive functioning that should be impaired by recent
self-control demands.
First, it seems obvious that some items of the CET may
well-depend on prior knowledge, which shrinks the variance
that could be explained by the ego depletion manipulation. For
instance, people who iron their shirts regularly will be more
accurate in the CET than someone who always thought ironing
is a waste of time. Second, if the use of the CET as a self-
control measure would be justified by its (potential) reliance
on executive working memory processes, recent research which
has found that working memory tasks possibly do not rely
on self-control strength (Dang, 2018) should be taken into
account. Third and most important, the CET was not designed
to measure fluctuating within-individual variables, such as self-
control strength, but primarily to help distinguish between
healthy individuals and those with certain clinical conditions
(e.g., dementia or ADHD; Bullard et al., 2004). Therefore, the
CET may be seen as a measure of “abnormality” (Bullard et al.,
2004, p. 835), which becomes clearer by paying closer attention to
how CET scores are determined. There are no correct solutions
in this test in the objective sense; that is, it does not matter, for
example, how many seeds actually are in a watermelon and how
far the participants’ answers diverge from this true value. Rather,
the scoring system is either based on the answers of a small
unrepresentative sample (N = 113; Bullard et al., 2004) or an
unknown sample reported in unpublished gray literature [Fein
et al., 1998; see Schmeichel et al. (2003)]. In Vohs et al.’s study,
estimations that were within the 25–75th percentile interval of
this norm sample received two points, answers within the 5–
24th or the 76–95th percentiles received one point, and answers
outside these intervals received zero points. How arbitrary this
scoring system is, becomes even more apparent given the fact
that in another ego depletion study, the participants within the
90% response range (rather than in the 95% response range;
Vohs et al., 2021) of the norm sample were awarded one point
(Schmeichel et al., 2003). From all this, it follows that, at best, the
CET can identify the (maybe clinically relevant) tendency to give
more or less untypical estimations, whereby the reasons for such
deviations are unknown. Given the concerns about the internal
consistencies of cognitive estimation tests, the items of these tests
may even measure different constructs (Scarpina et al., 2015).
Vohs et al. (2021) did not report the internal consistency of the
CET in their study, which is typically rather low [e.g., Cronbach’s
α = 0.60 in Schultz and Ryan (2019)]. Taken together, in our
opinion, the CET is neither a reliable nor a valid measure of self-
control. Thus, Vohs et al.’s (2021) writing task protocol condition
does not offer any insights into whether ego depletion is real or
not, independent of their results.
Our final concern with Vohs et al.’s study regards the overall
study design, namely that the ego depletion manipulations
were potentially confounded with the outcome measures. More
precisely, based on the present findings it is unclear whether the
writing task would have affected performance in the figure tracing
task differently than the e-crossing task. Likewise, it might be
possible that the e-crossing task had a stronger effect on the CET
than the writing task. Therefore, future studies might consider




Just as in the RRR, we are puzzled why the authors organized such
a complex and highly important research project choosing a task
as the dependent variable that by no means meets the definition
of a self-control task (i.e., overriding habits; Baumeister and
Vohs, 2016) and has not been demonstrated to psychometrically
soundly measure the construct of interest. The authors explain
that their task choice was based on the so-called paradigmatic
replication approach as they asked ego depletion experts to
generate “possible tasks for the study’s procedures, focusing on
their paradigmatic fit with the construct” (p. 4). It seems odd
to us that the experts chose the CET, which is not paradigmatic
at all for reliably and validly measuring momentary self-control.
According to Lishner (2015), replication efforts can be assigned
to a replication continuum ranging from “exact” to “maximally
divergent,” and “consistent but false findings are more likely to
occur in the process of replication when one moves farther away
from the ‘exact’ side of the replication continuum toward the
maximally divergent side” (p. 57). To us, the current replication
effort is closer to the divergent side of this continuum given
the—in our eyes—inappropriateness of the CET.
In general, it has to be acknowledged that there is no broad
consensus which tasks are valid self-control tasks and how long
self-control needs to be invested in a given task in order to
actually induce ego depletion [see also Englert (2017), e.g., Boat
et al. (2020)]. For instance, it remains unclear how long a Stroop
task should ideally last or how many trials it should contain (e.g.,
Wolff et al., 2021). Based on these inconsistencies in experimental
methodology, researchers have high levels of degrees of freedom
when planning ego depletion experiments.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We would like to point out that we are not picking a side
as to whether ego depletion exists or not; that is not the aim
of this opinion article. The goal is to outline the necessity to
properly operationalize the central constructs of a theoretical
model in order to test its validity, and we strongly believe
that this was not achieved in Vohs et al.’s (2021) multi-site
study. In a recent meta-analysis, Dang (2018) reported the
effect sizes for the most commonly used ego depletion tasks,
and we would encourage future replication efforts to choose
appropriate self-control tasks based on empirical evidence. We
agree with Nelson et al. (2018) that a critical methodological
reflection of traditional and current research practices can lead
to “psychology’s renaissance” (p. 511). We also agree with
Popper (1963) that “the criterion of the scientific status of a
theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability” (p. 33),
meaning that as researchers, it is our obligation to test the
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validity of theoretical models over and over again in order to
increase trust in their robustness, especially given the recent
replication crisis in psychological science. However, in order
to test a model’s validity, valid procedures need to be applied.
In our eyes, this was not the case in Vohs et al.’s (2021) new
multi-site project.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
CE and AB equally contributed to the writing of the manuscript
and the review of relevant related work. Both authors approved
the final version of the manuscript and agreed with the order of
presentation of the authors.
REFERENCES
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., and Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego
depletion: is the active self a limited resource? J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 74,
1252–1265. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252
Baumeister, R. F., and Vohs, K. D. (2016). Misguided effort
with elusive implications. Perspectiv. Psychol. Sci. 11, 574–575.
doi: 10.1177/1745691616652878
Bertrams, A. (2020). A schema-activation approach to failure and success in
self-control. Front. Psychol. 11:2256. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.02256
Bertrams, A., Englert, C., and Dickhäuser, O. (2010). Self-control strength in
the relation between trait test anxiety and state anxiety. J. Res. Personal. 44,
738–741. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2010.09.005
Boat, R., Hunte, R., Welsh, E., Dunn, A., Treadwell, E., and Cooper, S. B.
(2020). Manipulation of the duration of the initial self-control task within
the sequential-task paradigm: effect on exercise performance. Front. Neurosci.
14:1093. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2020.571312
Bullard, S. E., Fein, D., Gleeson, M. K., Tischer, N., Mapou, R. L., and Kaplan,
E. (2004). The Biber cognitive estimation test. Archiv. Clin. Neuropsychol. 19,
835–846. doi: 10.1016/j.acn.2003.12.002
Carter, E. C., and McCullough, M. E. (2013). Is ego depletion too incredible?
Evidence for the overestimation of the depletion effect. Behav. Brain Sci. 36,
683–684. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X13000952
Carter, E. C., and McCullough, M. E. (2014). Publication bias and the limited
strength model of self-control: has the evidence for ego depletion been
overestimated? Front. Psychol. 5:823. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00823
Clarkson, J. J., Hirt, E. R., Jia, L., and Alexander, M. B. (2010). When
perception is more than reality: the effects of perceived versus actual resource
depletion on self-regulatory behavior. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 98, 29–46.
doi: 10.1037/a0017539
Dang, J. (2018). An updated meta-analysis of the ego depletion effect. Psychol. Res.
82, 645–651. doi: 10.1007/s00426-017-0862-x
Dang, J., Barker, P., Baumert, A., Bentvelzen, M., Berkman, E., Buchholz, N., et al.
(2021). A multilab replication of the ego depletion effect. Soc. Psychol. Personal.
Sci. 12, 14–24. doi: 10.1177/1948550619887702
Englert, C. (2017). Ego depletion in sports: highlighting the importance of self-
control strength for high-level sport performance. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 16, 1–5.
doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.02.028
Englert, C., Dziuba, A., Wolff, W., and Giboin, L. S. (2021). An investigation of the
effects of self-reported self-control strength on shooting performance. Psychol.
Sport Exerc. 52:101839. doi: 10.1016/j.psychsport.2020.101839
Fein, D., Gleeson, M. K., Bullard, S., Mapou, R., and Kaplan, E. (1998). “The Biber
cognitive estimation test,” in Poster Presented at the Annual Meeting of the
International Neuropsychological Society (Honolulu, HI).
Hagger, M. S., and Chatzisarantis, N. L. (2016). Commentary: misguided effort
with elusive implications, and sifting signal from noise with replication science.
Front. Psychol. 7:621. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00621
Hagger, M. S., Chatzisarantis, N. L. D., Alberts, H., Anggono, C. O.,
Batailler, C., Birt, A. R., et al. (2016). A multilab preregistered replication
of the ego-depletion effect. Perspectiv. Psychol. Sci. 11, 546–573.
doi: 10.1177/1745691616652873
Hagger,M. S.,Wood, C., Stiff, C., and Chatzisarantis, N. L. D. (2010). Ego depletion
and the strength model of self-control: a meta-analysis. Psychol. Bullet. 136,
495–525. doi: 10.1037/a0019486
Lishner, D. A. (2015). A concise set of core recommendations
to improve the dependability of psychological research.
Rev. General Psychol. 19, 52–68. doi: 10.1037/gpr000
0028
Nelson, L. D., Simmons, J., and Simonsohn, U. (2018). Psychology’s renaissance.
Ann. Rev. Psychol. 69, 511–534. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-122216-01
1836
Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations – the Growth of Scientific
Knowledge. London: Routledge. doi: 10.1063/1.3050617
Scarpina, F., D’Aniello, G. E., Mauro, A., Castelnuovo, G., and
MacPherson, S. E. (2015). How many segments are there in an orange:
normative data for the new Cognitive Estimation Task in an Italian
population. Neurol. Sci. 36, 1889–1895. doi: 10.1007/s10072-015-2
276-0
Schmeichel, B. J., Vohs, K. D., and Baumeister, R. F. (2003). Intellectual
performance and ego depletion: role of the self in logical reasoning
and other information processing. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 85, 33–46.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.85.1.33
Schultz, P. P., and Ryan, R. M. (2019). Cognitive and affective benefits of a mindful
state in response to and in anticipation of pain. Mindfulness 10, 657–669.
doi: 10.1007/s12671-018-1013-1
Shallice, T., and Evans, M. E. (1978). The involvement of the frontal lobes in
cognitive estimation. Cortex 14, 294–303. doi: 10.1016/S0010-9452(78)80055-0
Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., Schmeichel, B. J., Twenge, J. M., Nelson, N. M., and
Tice, D. M. (2008). Making choices impairs subsequent self-control: a limited-
resource account of decision making, self-regulation, and active initiative. J.
Personal. Soc. Psychol. 94, 883–98. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.883
Vohs, K. D., Schmeichel, B. J., Gronau, Q. F., Finley, A., Wagenmakers, E. J., and
Albarracín, D. A. (2021). Multi-site preregistered paradigmatic test of the ego
depletion effect. Psychol. Sci. doi: 10.31234/osf.io/e497p. [Epub ahead of print].
Webb, T. L., and Sheeran, P. (2003). Can implementation intentions
help to overcome ego-depletion? J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 39, 279–286.
doi: 10.1016/S0022-1031(02)00527-9
Wimmer, M. C., Dome, L., Hancock, P. J., and Wennekers, T. (2019). Is the letter
cancellation task a suitable index of ego depletion? Soc. Psychol. 50, 345–354.
doi: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000393
Wolff, W., and Martarelli, C. S. (2020). Bored into depletion? Towards a
tentative integration of perceived self-control exertion and boredom as guiding
signals for goal-directed behavior. Perspectiv. Psychol. Sci. 15, 1272–1283.
doi: 10.1177/1745691620921394
Wolff, W., Sieber, V., Bieleke, M., and Englert, C. (2021). Task duration and task
order do not matter: no effect on self-control performance. Psychol. Res. 85,
397–407. doi: 10.1007/s00426-019-01230-1
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2021 Englert and Bertrams. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication
in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2021 | Volume 15 | Article 658890
